PERCEPTION OF COUNTER TERRORIST MEASURES OF FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY CORPS (FRSC) BY ITS PERSONNEL

BY

MOSES ADERIBIGBE <u>ODOGIYON</u>

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA. IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MLCJ DEGREE

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this project is purely a project of my own research effort in the Department of Sociology and was duly supervised. It has not been presented or published anywhere by any person, institution, or organization or used for any previous application for a degree or other qualifications.

All sources of information used are duly acknowledged by references

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MOSES ADERIBIGBE ODOGIYON   **DATE**
MLCJ/SOC-SCI/15766/2011-2012

CERTIFICATION

This project titled: PERCEPTION OF COUNTER TERRORIST MEASURES OF THE FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY CORPS BY ITS PERSONEL meets the requirements governing the award of Masters Degree in Law and Criminal Justice System (MLCJ) in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and its hereby approved for its contribution to knowledge.

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DR.J.E, GYONG

PROJECT SUPERVISOR   DATE

…………………………………………. …………………………..

DR.A, LABO   DATE

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

………………………………………….. …………………………..

PROFF. A.A JOSHUA   DATE

DEAN, POST GRADUATE SCHOOL

ACKNOWLEGEMENT

This research work is dedicated to the memory of those Officers and Marshals and those security agents who lost their lives while responding to terrorism in Nigeria. May their gentle souls rest in peace (Amen)

Abstract

The Federal Road Safety Corps, citizens, and other security agencies of the government has been the object of attack in Nigeria in recent times by terrorist insurgents. Yet it seems that the Corps lacks the necessary security apparatus to contain this ugly trend

The fundamental research aims and objectives of the research are first to find out the response of FRSC to terrorism in terms of man power and personnel, second to find out the response of FRSC to terrorism in terms of increased expenditures and funding, third to find out the response of FRSC to terrorism in terms of additional provision of equipment and facilities, fourth, to find out the operational strategies of FRSC in response to terrorism, fifth, to find out the effect of the architecture to access to FRSC offices by members of the public, lastly, to find out ways to improve on the security architecture of the FRSC.

The research was carried out in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, members of the road safety corps were the research respondents, there consist of 180 respondents across the Utako and Kubwa divisions of the corps. Similarly, the types and source of data was primary data which were men of the FRSC Abuja. The quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques were employed through the instrumentality of the questionnaires, in-depth and observation guild respectively. The multi-stage cluster sampling procedure and the purposive sampling were employed for the quantitative and qualitative research techniques.

Quantitative and qualitative techniques of data analysis will be employed for this study. The large volume of data generated through questionnaire was presented, edited and analyzed using computer software called the Statistical Package for Social

Sciences (SPSS). The qualitative data generated through the IDIs was critically analyzed through what could be referred to as "thick description" approach.

At the course of the findings, it was gathered that the FRSC has not responded to terrorism optimally in terms of man power and personnel, increased expenditure and funding, lacks the necessary facilities and equipment to contain terrorism. However, it was gathered that surveillance, inter personal communication between the public and the corps, construction of high walls and bumps on the road leading to the FRSC offices is vital to contain terrorism. Hence, it could be concluded that the FRSC has not lived up to expectation in containing terrorism, however, the FRSC needs to improve and upgrade its equipment, be adequately funded, equipped with arms and ammunition, and preventive security measures be boosted around all FRSC offices nation-wide

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The history of terrorism in Africa can be traced to the period of colonialism. Although prior to colonialism, there have been evidence of violent clashes among various groups within African states fighting for one cause or the other. However, terrorism was more evident during the colonial period.(Hubschle, 2005).

Hubschle(2005)posited that "Historical data shows that the African continent has witnessed a wide array of terror incidents including revolutionary state sponsored and state terrorism". Past liberation agreement that fought for independence in their countries such as "African National Congress (A.N.C), The African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-pf), The West African Peoples Organization (WAPO) and Franc de Libertacaode Mocambilique (FRELIMO), are labeled as terrorist organizations. Anette H, stressed the fact that it is ironical to state that the terrorists perpetrated by the colonialist power were not recorded, while liberation movement in Africa were recorded and labeled terrorist. The Colonialist countries committed atrocities upon the African populace. Hubschle(2005),termed this form of terrorism as "Colonial Terror" a distinct form of terrorism perpetrated during colonial and post colonial periods. Terrorism in Africa was largely facilitated by globalization, pre-modern globalization ushered in the period of colonization in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. In Africa, this historical epoch was the beginning of modern terrorism. (Hubchle, 2005)

The Nigerian State has its story to tell about colonial terror and other terrorist activities which were mobilized as a result of colonial policies. This came about as a result of revolutionary movements and violent inter-ethno and religious crises.

Suberu and Osagie (2010) stated that, ethnic and violent clashes can be traced to colonialism and its attendant policies. Colonialism brought about socio-economic inequality through the institutionalization of classes and there by class struggle. A state of mutual suspicion existed among the major ethnic groups in Nigeria. There existed violent clashes among these various ethnic groups as a result of an economic under-tone, especially among the ruling class, this characterized the political spectrum during the 1960,s (the various coups were a reflection of struggle to control power and economy) The major ethnic groups are keen to control the central government due to the fact that all the resources are centralized, thus making positions at the governmental level very lucrative. Furthermore, Falola (2011) in his book, 'colonialism and violence in Nigeria" argued that the root cause of violent activities in Nigeria today, such as Jos crisis, the Niger Delta violence, and all forms of violence in the Northern and Southern part of Nigeria respectively, can be traced to colonialism. At that time the natives challenged colonial rule through violence. Therefore, a "public culture" was created in the Nigerian polity, in which the citizenry are now inclined to commit acts of violence at any sense of exploitations from colonial policies. Major notable violent protests in the colonial era were the Aba women riotof 1929, and the Ekumeku wars in which the guerilla form of resistance was used against the British occupation of Nigeria.

Furthermore, in the 1980's another economic depression hit the nation; in the period of "oil boom" there was a sharp drop in the sale of crude oil which was rapidly becoming the export earning of that time. Responding to the economic crises, the government under the advice of the IMF introduced the Structural Adjustment Programme. This austerity measure which was aimed at wage cuts, dismissal from work, cuts in government expenditure, etc, resulted in severe hardship among the

populace. The end product became violent protest and domestic terrorism towards the government. In 1988, in response to an increase in the price of fuel, riots broke out in Jos and in Sokoto state, which turned out to be more intense. Moreover, in May and June of 1989, several towns such as Lagos, Ibadan, Benin city and Portharcout revolted against the IMF plan which resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and properties worth millions of Naira.(Falola, 2011)

In all of the above scenarios, certain issues are common to them, crime was alleged to have been committed , people were alleged to be victimized , fear of crime increased, economic activities were distorted, social lives disorganized and security systems of the nation were threatened. Having observed some of these global incidences of violence and crime increase particularly across the nooks and crannies of Nigeria, the specific focus of the study however is the assessment of the security architecture of the Federal Road Safety Corps in response to terrorism.

The homeland security (2010) identified the following forms of terrorism: these include bombing which are the most common forms of terrorist act. Typically, improvised explosive devices are inexpensive and easy to make. Modern devises are smaller and harder to detect. They contain very destructive capabilities; for example on 7th august 1998, two American embassies in Africa were bombed. The bomb claimed the lives over 200 people, including 12 innocent American citizens and injured over 5,000 civilians. Terrorists can use materials that are readily available to the average consumer to construct a bomb.

Kidnapping and hostage taking is another form of terrorism, terrorists use kidnappings and hostage taking to establish a bargaining position and to elicit publicity.

Kidnappings are one of the difficult acts for a terrorist group to accomplish; but if a kidnapping is successful, it can gain terrorist money, release of jailed comrade, and publicity for an extended period.

Hostage taking involves a seizure of a facility, or location and the taking of the hostages. Unlike kidnappings, hostage taking provokes a confrontation with the authorities. It forces authorities to either make a dramatic decision or to comply with the terrorist demands. It is overt and designed to attract and hold a media attention. The terrorist's intended target is the audience affected by the hostage's confinement not the hostage.

Armed attack and assassination is another form of terrorism, it includes raids, and ambushes.

Assassinations are the killing of selected victim, usually by bombing or small arms. Drive-by shootings is a common technique employed by unsophisticated or loosely organized terrorist groups.

Historically, terrorists have assassinated specific individuals for psychological effects (Homeland security 2010)

Arson and fire bombings is another form of terrorism, it involves, incendiary devices which are cheap and easy to hide.

 Arson and firebombing are easily conducted by terrorist groups that may not be well organized, equipped, or trained as a major terrorist organization. Arson or firebombing against a utility, hostel, government building or industrial center, portrays an image that the ruling government is incapable of maintaining order.

Hijacking and skyjacking is the last form of terrorism identified by the Homeland security. Hijacking involves the seizure by force of a surface vehicle, its passenger, or

its cargo. Skyjacking is the taking of an aircraft, which creates a mobile hostage barricade situation.

It provides terrorists with hostages from many nations and draws heavy media attention.

Skyjacking also provides mobility for the terrorist to relocate the aircraft to countries that supports their cause and provides them with a human shield, making retaliation difficult.

Terrorist organizations also conduct robberies and extortion when they need to finance their acts and they don't have sponsorship from sympathetic nations (Homeland security 2010).

1.1 The Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) in Nigeria was established as a child of necessity, to arrest the rate of traffic crashes which existed in the 70's. In Nigeria, the concern of government therefore to stem the tide of accidents and its related tragic consequences led to the creation of FRSC in 1988 led by decree 45, as amended in 1992by decree 35, otherwise known as the FRSC act cap 141 laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 1990.

The enabling laws conferred on the commission the following statutory powers and function:

- Preventing or minimizing accidents on the high ways;

- Clearing obstructions on any part of the high way;

- Educating drivers, motorist and other members of the public generally; on the proper use of the High ways;

- Giving prompt attention and care to the victims of accidents;

- Conducting researches into the causes of accidents on the high way;

- Making the highway safe for motorist and other road users;

- Recommending works and devices designed to eliminate or minimize accidents on the highways and advising the Federal and State governments to including the Federal Capital Territory administration and relevant government agencies on the localities where such works and devices are required;

- Educating drivers, motorist and other members of the public generally; on the proper use of the highways;

- Designing and producing of the drivers license to be used by various categories of vehicle operators;

- Determining from time to time ,the requirement to be satisfied by an applicant for a drivers license;

- Designing and producing vehicle number plates;

- The standardization of highway traffic codes;

- Giving prompt attention and care to victims of accidents;

- Conducting researches into the cause of motor accidents and methods' of preventing them and putting into use the result of such researches;

- Determining and enforcing speed limits for all categories of roads and vehicles and controlling the use of speed limiting devices;

- Co-operating with bodies agencies groups engaged in road safety activities or in the prevention of accidents on the highways;

- Making regulations in pursuance of any of the functions assigned to the Corps by or under this Act;

- Regulating the use of sirens, flashers or beacon lights on vehicles other than ambulances or vehicles belonging to the Armed Forces, Nigerian Police, Fire Service and other Para Military Agencies;

- Providing roadside and mobile clinics for the treatment of accident victims free of charge; and

- Re-establishment and regulation of Ambulance Services.

It is pertinent to note however that the FRSC though empowered to perform the aforementioned is not empowered directly by law to wage war on terrorism by the means of any security architecture in the form of any military hardware.

It is also worthy of mention here that terrorism and terrorist activity have taken so many dimensions on the road, and in public and private vehicles etc.

The thrust of this study is to assess the response of the FRSC to the problems of terrorism in Nigeria.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The FRSC as well as other security agencies have been the object of attack in recent times. Men of the corps in active service across Nigeria have been killed through various methods by terrorists and other related terrorist activities. Their offices and vehicles across the country have also been seen as objects of attack by this various terrorist groups.

In Nigeria, it has become common for terrorists to regard any person in uniform connected to the government as an obstacle to their acts and therefore they regard uniform personnel's as enemies and they are being attacked on frequent occasions. While this attack is going on daily, the FRSC seems to lack the necessary security architecture to curtail and contain the activities of these terrorists which in-turn makes them to perform their duty with fear of unknown.

Similarly, the FRSC is charged with the responsibility of curbing road accidents but impeded by some problems which tend to render them ineffective.

Odekunle (1981), argued that security personnel and their mode of operation and other attributes of the agencies of prevention, control and corrections do sometimes aggravate rather than reduce the problem.

In the same light, a critical analysis of the facilities available to the FRSC will reveal the strategies of the agency. For instance, does the FRSC have adequate and relevant facilities for the management control of terrorist attack?

Given the statutory role of the FRSC, issues of their training and facilities available to them, vis-à-vis the complexity of terrorism in Nigeria, it is a common problem to note that the FRSC in its present state and organization seems not to have adequate security architecture that can contain terrorism. In simple terms, the FRSC personnel are not armed and are not protected by bullet proofs or helmet, but rather depend solely on the Nigerian police (who are not protected themselves) for protection.

To be precise, what are the strategies adopted by the FRSC in its bid to contain terrorism? Similarly, the FRSC seems to be confronted with other structural problems like inadequate manpower, poor funding, inadequate equipment, operational strategies, and inaccessibility of the public with the FRSC, which is however fundamental to the fight against terrorism.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following questions stand as targeted areas of interest in this research work. These include:

-What is the response of FRSC to terrorism in terms of man power?

-What is the response of FRSC to terrorism in terms of funding?

-What is the response of FRSC in terms of additional equipment and facilities?

-How has terrorism affected the operational strategies of FRSC?

- How has terrorism affected access to FRSC offices by members of the public?

-What can be done to enhance the security architecture of the FRSC?

1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of this study is to assess the views of the personnel of the FRSC in terms of their response to terrorist attack in the Federal Capital Territory.

The specific research objectives are:

1   To find out the response of FRSC to terrorism in terms of man power and personnel.

2   To find out the response of FRSC to terrorism in terms of increased expenditures and funding.

3   To find out the response of FRSC to terrorism in terms of additional provision of equipment and facilities.

4   To find out the operational strategies of FRSC in response to terrorism.

5   To find out the effect of the architecture to access FRSC offices by members of the public.

6   To find out ways to improve on the security architecture of the FRSC.

1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The geographical scope of the study is the Federal Road Safety Commands in Utako and kubwa Abuja, while the intellectual scope is the assessment of the counter terrorist measures adopted by the FRSC. This research is basically confined to the assessment of the security architecture of FRSC in response to terrorism. This will

cover the security Architecture in terms of man power, operational strategy, possible effects, funding, and additional equipment in the FCT command.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Firstly, it will create a clearer explanation of the crime of terrorism and how it is checked by the security architecture of the FRSC in the Federal Capital Territory.

Secondly, it will create an obvious understanding on how the operational system of the FRSC is being affected by terrorism and other agents.

Thirdly, this study will provide empirical basis and materials for those who are interested in the study of crime of terrorism and the Road Safety Corps. Finally, recommendations based on this research will assist or aid governmental and nongovernmental institutions and organizations towards better understanding of the problem of terrorism.

1.7 DEFINITION OF TERMS

ARCHITECTURE: the security apparatus put in place by the corps in its bid to contain terrorism

ARSON: involves, the use of incendiary devices which are cheap and easy to hide to kill.

ASSASSINATIONS: Is the killing of selected victim, usually by bombing or the use of small arms.

BOKO HARAM: meaning western education is a sin- a sect of Islamic group that engages in bombing and other forms of attacks in the country.

BOMBING: Is the use of improvised explosive to claim lives

FRSC: the acronym for the Federal, Road Safety Corps

HIJACKING AND SKYJACKING: involves the seizure by force of a surface vehicle, its passenger, or its cargo.

HOSTAGE TAKING: involves a seizure of a facility, or location and the taking of the hostages.

KIDNAPPING: is the seizure of a person or persons against their will for a ransom or other purposes that concern the Kidnaper.

SKYJACKING: is the taking of an aircraft, which creates a mobile hostage barricade situation.

SECURITY: involves securing lives and properties with the aid of security apparatuses

TERRORISM: is the use of violent action in order to achieve political, social aims to force a government to act.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1   INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews relevant literature in relation to the problem under study; the pertinent literature focuses on identifying contributions already made on the subject under investigation. This chapter will review relevant literature on types of terrorism, response to terrorism in terms of man-power, funding, equipment, operational strategies and facilities among others.

Similarly, in this chapter the theory (psychological) as regards the reason why the FRSC responds to terrorism in the manner it does will be reviewed.

2.2.   DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

The concept of terrorism today is a subject shrouded in a lot of controversies. There have been questions as to what constitutes terrorism. For the purpose of this study, the definition of terrorism can be perceived from two schools of thought. The first school is termed the idealistic conception of terrorism, and the second school of thought is termed the realist conception of terrorism.(Peters, S 2010) The idealist school of thought stressed the fact that every act that produces fear, terror, or death, whether legitimately carried out or not by an individual group or state, is an act of terrorism. The realist school of thought, on the other hand, sees terrorism essentially as an attack by clandestine groups on non-combatants or civilians in order to draw attention by imbuing fear in the public to coerce a state actor into carrying out an action for their political objectives. One of the proponents of the realist school of thought is the United State government.

Section 2656 (F) of the United States code provides a definition of terrorism. According to title 22, terrorism is defined as premeditated politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by sub-national or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience. The United States department defines a terrorist group as "any group practicing, or that has significant sub-group that practice international terrorism.

Wiotti and Kauppi (2010) define terrorism as "a politically motivated violence, aimed at achieving a demoralizing effect on the public's and government.

Wilkinson (2011) defines terrorism as "a systematic use of coercive intimidation usually to serve political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence and to publicize a cause as well as to coerce a target into assenting to aims.

Cronin (2012), conceives of terrorism as "the threat or use of seemingly random violence against innocents for political ends by a non state actor.

Accordingly Spiegel and Wheling (2005) define terrorism as "violence across international boundaries intended to coerce a target group into meeting political demands.

The African Union defines terrorism as "any act which is a violation of the criminal law of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any member or group of persons that causes or may cause danger to public or private property natural resources, environmental and cultural heritage. (African Union Convention, 2004)

The Nigerian government has very recently provided a definition for terrorism. They define a terrorist as "anyone who is involved or who causes an attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death; kidnapping of a person,

destruction to a government or public facility, transport system an infrastructural facility including an information system, a fixed platform located on the intercontinental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss.

Ogbu (2005) defines terrorism as violent attack by faceless groups, individuals, or the state in order to push forward their political, primordial, and personal objectives. Section 4 of the terrorist (prevention) act 2012 defines and prescribes punishment for an act of terrorism: it defines terrorism as the calculated and extreme use of violence or threatened violence, perpetuated by malice, to cause serious harm or violence against individuals, governments and their asset with the intention to attain political, religious or ideological goals, through intimidation or coercion or instilling fear on civilian population.

For the purpose of this research however, terrorism is defined as an act of premeditated violence, which is politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated and perpetrated against both combatant and non combatant targets alike by sub-national or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience.

2.3 TYPES OF TERRORISM

Different types of terrorism have been defined by law makers, security professionals and scholars, types differ according to what kind of attack an attacker uses (biological, for example) or by what they are trying to defend (as in eco-terrorism). Here a comprehensive list of types of terrorism, with links to more information examples and definitions will be offered. (Oyiniyi, AB 2010)

According to the United States Center for Disease Control, (1994) the first types of terrorism identified are State terrorism, it refers to a government committing acts of

violence against its citizens. Joseph Stalin's purges in the USSR, where thousands were executed or imprisoned for apparent anti-communist activities and sentiments are good examples.

More recent example include the "dirty wars" of the 1980's in Latin American nations like Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Nations that support, tolerate or engage in international terrorism are considered state sponsors of terrorism.(Obafemi, 2011).

The United States government maintains a list of nations which it considers to be sponsors of international terrorism. Seven nations are currently listed as supporting terrorism by funding, training, supplying or providing safe haven to known terrorists. Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria currently hold this distinction (Wilkinson, 2010).

Iran is the most notorious and prolific sponsor of terrorism utilizing its own agents and a variety of Islamic terrorist groups it supports and sometimes directs.

Iran has been accused of assassinating dissidents abroad and funneling money, weapons and intelligence to middle Eastern terrorist groups like, Hezbollah, Hamas and the popular front for the liberation of Palestine –General command(PFLP-GC). These groups have committed numerous attacks against Americans, and Israeli targets. (Samuel, 1988).

The US and its allies considers the actions of these nations serious impediments to counter terrorist efforts and international security, therefore, sanctions are often imposed on terrorist –sponsoring nations in order to compel them to discontinue supports.

Many definitions of terrorism restrict it to act by non-State actors but it can also be argued that States can, and have been terrorists. States can use force or the threat of force, without declaring war, to terrorize citizens and achieve a political goal.

Germany under Nazi rule was described in this way. It has also been argued that States participate in international terrorism, often by proxy. The United State considers Iran the most prolific sponsor of terrorism because Iran arms group such as Hezbollah, help carry out its foreign policy objectives. The United States has also been called terrorist, for example through its covert sponsorship of Nicaraguan contras in the 1980s (Ogbu, 2005)

The second type of terrorism brought to the limelight is the bio-terrorism: it refers to the intentional release of toxic biological agents to harm and terrorize civilians, in the name of a political or other cause. The US center for disease control has classified the viruses, bacteria and toxins that could be used in an attack. These included

- Anthrax (Bacillus anthracic)

- Botullsm (clostridlumbotullnum toxin)

- The plague (yersiniapestis)

- Smallpox (varola major)

- Hemorraphagic fever, due to Ebola or Marburg virus

   (US Centre for Disease Control1994).

Oyeniyi, AB (2010) described the third type of terrorism as cyber- terrorism. Cyber terrorists use information technology and communications, such as computer systems and telecommunication as a tool to orchestrate a traditional attack. More often cyber terrorism refers to an attack on information technology itself in a way that would radically disrupt network services. For example cyber terrorists could disable networked emergency systems or hack into networks, housing critical financial information. (Oyeniyi, AB 2010)

Murphy, D (2002) described the fourth type of terrorism as Eco-terrorism. It is coined to describe violence in the interests of environmentalism. In general, environmental extremists sabotage property to inflict economic damage on industries or actors they see as harming animals or on natural environment. These have included fur companies, logging companies and animal research laboratories for example.

(U S Centre for Disease Control1994).

According to the department of Homeland security, nuclear terrorism refers to a number of different ways nuclear materials might be exploited as a terrorist tactic. These include attacking nuclear facilities, purchasing nuclear weapons, or building nuclear weapons or otherwise finding ways to disperse radioactive materials (Homeland security 2010)

Jeremy Lott (2001) argued that religious terrorism performed by group or individuals, the motivation of which is typically rooted in faith-based tenets. Terrorist acts throughout the centuries have been performed on religious grounds with the hope to either spread or enforce a system of belief, viewpoint or opinion. Religious terrorism does not in itself necessarily define an individual or a group view or interpretation of that belief system's teaching.

The last type of terrorism is that described by the United States national advisory committee on criminal justice standard and goals in 1975 as political terrorism; violent criminal behavior designed primarily to generate fear in the community or substantial segment of it for political purposes the committee also coined the non-political terrorism according to them it is the act of terrorism that is not aimed at political purposes but exhibits "conscious design to create and maintain a high degree

of fear for coercive purposes, but the end is individual or collective gain rather than the achievement of a political objective.(Peters, 2010).

According to the United States national advisory committees (1975) an act of terrorism, which is committed for ideological or political motives but which are not part of a concerted campaign to capture control of the state is a limited political terrorism.

2.4 RESPONSE TO TERRORISM WORLDWIDE:

Terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare. Responses to terrorism are broad in scope. They can include re-alignment of the political spectrum and reassessment of fundamental values. (BBC News 2008).

There is a lot of concerted effort made by the Federal Road Safety Corps to curtail and contain terrorism. Some of these attempts are geared towards manpower development, funding, equipment/ facilities and operational strategies. Specific types of response to terrorism worldwide include:

2.4.1 TARGETED LAWS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, DEPORTATION, AND ENHANCED POLICE POWERS;

Dana, (2010) argued that it is a common practice in the United States and Britain for enacting strict laws directed at punishing terrorists, their aids and sponsors with the aim of curbing terrorism. These laws includes conviction and deportation of terrorist suspects and their collaborators, increase in the powers of the Police and other anti-Terrorist agents to arrest, try and execute terrorists without delay as according to him,(Dana 2010) has prevented other corrupt and sharp practices associated with the arrest and release of terrorists by "Strong Government powers"

2.4.2 **TARGET HARDENING**:

According to Dana (2010) target hardening such as locking doors or adding traffic barriers have been the strategies in Britain and particularly all developed societies to contain terrorism. He argued that people charged to lock the doors of their homes with sophisticated locks, preventive and protective measures. He argued that bumps were also constructed in strategic and important locations to add to traffic barriers.

2.4.3 **PREEMPTIVE OR REACTIVE MILITARY ACTION**:

It is a known practice in Britain and the United States that as a fundamental strategy the Police, FBI, other anti-terrorist Government agencies are preemptive and reactive in orientation. Hence the chance of the act of terrorism been carried out undetected, and if perpetrated, the perpetrators not apprehended are minimal. This is made possible through active military actions and commitment to duty (Dana 2010).

2.4.4 **INCREASED INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES**

In Britain, America and other developed societies a lot have been done to checkmate terrorism, closed and far open circuit cameras are mounted at strategic locations, aerial cameras are installed in space, security personnel's are equipped with body scanners (called the x-ray backscatter technology) adequate number of security agents are made available, efficient communication networks and call lines put in place to enhance easy communication between the public and security agents, room was given for public and private partnership in security related matters and the bio data of virtually all residents in the towns is got to enhance easy tracking when crime (Terrorism) is committed. Also the government especially in the United States makes huge budgetary allocation to the security sector. Also the joint patrol of different security agents are enhanced also is their interaction and communication. Similarly,

virtually all the security agents are equipped with modern security software (James 2009).

2.4.5 MORE PERMISIVE INTERROGATION AND DETENTION POLICIES ENHANCED

Dana (2010) argued that in Britain, as part of the call for increased powers of the police and other anti Terrorist agencies, more permissive interrogative room is given to enhance the interrogation of suspected members of the public and illegal immigrants to curb terrorism.

2.4.6 PREEMPTIVE HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES AND CAPACITY BUILDING

According to Dana (2010) as part of their security strategies in the United States and Britain, preemptive humanitarian activities and capacity building is been given priority; technical training given to personnel's at successful times. High level training and staff exchange programme with sister organization in South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Ethiopia, India, Israel, and Canada for additional technical assistance and best practices is been offered.

2.5   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The basic theory that tends to explain the "why" the FRSC responds to terrorism in the manner they do is the psychological theory of crime. It has the following basic assumptions: first, it recognizes the individual as the basic unit of analysis. That is individual human being are solely responsible for their criminal or deviant acts. Second, an individual personality is the motivational element that derives behavior within individuals. Third, criminals and deviants are seen as suffering from personality deficiencies. Thus crimes like terrorism result from abnormal, dysfunctional or inappropriate mental processes within the personality of the individual. Finally, these defective and abnormal mental processes could be caused by a variety of things including a diseased mind, inappropriate learning, improper conditioning, and the absence of appropriate role model or the presence of inappropriate role model (Bandura, 1979).

Driving home the point however is the assessment of the psychological theory developed by Sigmund Freud. It states that all humans have a natural drive and urges that are repressed in the unconscious. Additionally, all humans have a criminal tendency. These tendencies are curbed however through the process of socialization. A child, who is improperly socialized, could develop a personality disturbance that causes him or her to direct anti-social impulses either inwards or out wards. Those who direct them inward become neurotic while those who direct them outward become criminals. The base point here is the assumption that all human beings posses criminal tendencies and drives, that if not checked could lead to crime, hence the reasons why the FRSC responds to terrorism the manner it does. The theory believes that criminals suffer from mental deficiency which if not checked or corrected could lead to crime like terrorism.

Similarly, in an attempt to explain crime and delinquency, Edwin Sutherland introduces his theory of differential association (1947).

The theory posits that, exposure to criminal definitions and associations favorable to criminal tendency, motivates a person to learn criminal traits depending on the process of communication pattern and frequency, duration, priority and the intensity of learning. It further asserts that a person comes to adopt criminal as against non-criminal behavior patterns if he or she learns to violate laws, and if the value conducive to putting that knowledge into practice are stronger than the persons anti criminal sentiments.

Adopting the above assertion in relation to the subject at hand , acts of terrorism will occur, if terrorist who are believed according to this theories, to be suffering from unsound mind or pushed by criminal drives, have favorable grounds for practicing their acts , hence the reason why the FRSC responds to terrorism in the manner it does. To avoid terrorism, security architecture is to be put in place to checkmate this anomaly.

The both argument by Freud and Sutherland stand to buttress the point but the argument of the former is more appropriate.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0: Introduction

This chapter provides the research design for this study. Research methodology basically means an actual procedure for collection and analysis of data. It is very important in every research, and as such, the methods used to collect and analyze data needs to be properly stated to enhance easy replication by any other desirous researcher. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the study area, sampling and sampling technique, method of data analysis, problems and limitation, and a conclusion will be drawn.

3.2   DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH LOCATION

The Federal Capital Territory is made up of many districts of which Utako is one. Utako is located at the phase II of the Federal Capital Territory. It lies in the North West axis of the Central Business District of the Federal Capital Territory and lies between Jabi, and Mabushi Cadastral zones.Utako has the population of about 800 thousand by the (2006 population census) its population has also grown tremendously since then due to a lot of demolitions done by the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory around its neighboring communities. The population of Utako is highly heterogeneous. The community consists of persons of different occupational backgrounds (traders, civil servants and indigenous farmers) there exist a lot of trading exercises taking place along major streets. The community also hosts some motor parks and the FRSC Command which is the interest of the research. (Obasi, 2012)

This research was carried out in the Utako Command of the Federal Road Safety Corps, FCT. The Command covers Abuja and Kubwa unit commands and as such, respondents were drawn from both Utako and Kubwa divisions respectively.

3.3   TYPES AND SOURCES OF DATA

The type of data for this study was primary. The primary sources of data were men of the Federal Road Safety Corps Federal Capital Territory, Command.

3.4   TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION

This research used both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The quantitative data was collected through survey technique. It was self administered while the qualitative data were generated via in-depth interview and observation methods.

3.4.1 SURVEY TECHNIQUE

Isiugo, (2002) asserts that survey techniques are well – structured procedures for data collection which involve the assignment of numerical values to non numeric characteristics. Thus quantitative technique enables for wide coverage of respondents particularly when the population for the study is relatively high. It also helps in easy statistical analysis. However, the technique does not give the researcher the opportunity to explain the problem under study, as he/she is confronted with already structured questions and options to choose answers from. Despite the above shortcomings, this study made use of the technique, owing to the fact that the population of this study is relatively high. The researcher administered the questionnaires on its respondents. A questionnaire is a list of question relating to the aims and objectives of the research question and a hypothesis to verify, which the respondent is required to respond by indicating his or her views. (Haruna 2010).

The researcher having constructed the questions in line with the objectives of the study personally administered them on the respondents who are men of the FRSC.

3.4.2   QUALITATIVE TECHNIQUE

Gyong (2011) sees qualitative technique as a "research method that emphasizes the study and analysis of the nature and character of social phenomenon based on live or everyday experiences of the being studied." In other words, qualitative technique gives the researcher the opportunity to see things from the perspective of the respondents and thereby reducing the imposition of the researcher. In this regard, in-depth interview (IDI) personal observation was used. An IDI is a technique designed to elicit a vivid picture of participant's perspective on a research problem. It is usually a face – to – face conversation between the interviewer and the key informant. For the purpose of this study, two (2) in-depth interviews was conducted out of this number, one (1) officer each from the Utako and Kubwa districts was interviewed respectively. The choice of the respondents is basically to enable the researcher to have an explicit understanding of the key informant's perception of the activities of terrorist and how the corps has managed to contain it. Similarly, the researcher as a member of the corps personally and engage the services of other corps member (FRSC) to observe the security architecture of the FRSC with the aim of getting firsthand information on the response of the FRSC in relation to curbing terrorism.

3.4.3 INSTRUMENTS FOR DATA COLLECTION

These are vehicles or means through which primary data are generated for a research. For the purpose of this study, questionnaire, IDI guide and observation guides were used.

Questionnaire was used as instrument for quantitative data collection, which was self-administered. Questionnaire is a list of preset question (Haralambo sand Holborn, 2008:822) that captures the objectives of the research. It captured six section namely; socio-demographic variables (personal data), the response to terrorism terms of manpower and personnel, equipment, funding, operational strategies, the effect of the security architecture to assess to FRSC offices by members of the public and ways they can be improved upon.

The questionnaire also contains closed and open − ended questions. On the one hand, closed − ended questions restrict the respondents to certain options, as provided by the researcher to choose from. The closed − ended questions for this study was presented with options of 'Yes' or 'No' as well as likert scale options of five points ranging as follows: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree was equally used. This helps the researcher to know the "degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the statements" (Osuala, 2005:248).

One great advantage of this kind of question is that, it is easy to analyze statistically. However, the questions are difficult to set. On the other hand, an open-ended question gives the respondents the opportunity to provide answer they deem fit for each question asked without predetermined options by the researcher. In other words, the respondents are at liberty to choose their own answer. Open − ended questions are usually easy to set but very difficult to analyze, as respondents are likely to have variety of views on a particular question asked.

The choice of questionnaire is to guarantee relative coverage of the subjects (residents of Utuko and kubwa). Just as observed by Gyong (2011 b:9), "quantitative technique is basically survey which emphasizes the collection of mass data from large body of individuals."

The researcher strongly believes that the use of questionnaire helps in supplying information that can be statistically analyzed and needed for generalization of findings at the end of the research. In this regards, questionnaire served the purpose of eliciting large volume of primary data.

3.4.4 INSTRUMENT FOR QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

For the collection of qualitative data, IDI and the observation guides was used as instruments. The IDI and observation guides consist of topic guides to ensure that important issues were not forgotten during the interview discussion and the observation process. On the whole, the key informants (as for IDI) were answering questions that are unstructured and flexible. This, the researcher hopes would provide needed information on the research problem. Again, the guides was constructed and administered in English language, as the language is widely spoken by the personnel's of the FRSC of Utuko and kubwa respectively.

3.4.5 POPULATION OF THE STUDY

According to Gyong (2011) "the identification of the population of study is a fundamental requirement for sampling." The populations of this research were the personnel's of the FRSC, Uako and Kubwa districts respectively (FCT).

3.4.6 SAMPLING PROCEDURE

This research adopted multi-stage cluster sampling procedure for survey technique and purposive sampling for the qualitative research.

3.4.6.1   SAMPLING FOR SURVEY TECHNIQUE

A sample of 180 respondents was selected. Due to financial constraints and time, it was not possible to cover the entire population, the researcher however, wrote out the various Departments (seven) of the corps out of the seven departments, two each from the two divisions (Utako and Kubwa) were selected using the lottery method, having written the departments on a piece of paper, they were squeezed, and two Divisions were selected using the simple random methods. With the aid of the data of the personnel's at the disposal of the researcher, he wrote out the serial number of 100 each from the four departments selected, squeeze them , placed them in a separate bowl out of which forty five(45) each were selected to represent the various departments. The documentation tradition of the FRSC is that that permits the writing of the serial number of men on the official register based on year of entry. Basically it starts with oo1-to the end, say- 212 and subject to review in accordance with the cannon of the FRSC. Hence one hundred and Eighty respondents were sampled and the questionnaires administered on them accordingly.

To be precise the process involves:

step one: 1, the researcher wrote out the names of the various Departments (seven) that makes up the Utako and Kubwa Districts respectively, on a sheet of paper, squeezed them out of which the personnel of surveillance and human development were selected and represented the sample of the Kubwa Division while the personnel of the Department of training and logistics represented the sample of the Utako Division.

Step Two: the researcher wrote out the serial number of the respondents from 1 to 100 on a sheet of paper, placed them on a separate bowl for both Districts, out of which 45

each were picked from the four Departments so selected, bringing it to a total of 180 respondents.

It is worthy of note that the number of the personnel's administered the questionnaire was noted and recorded for easy collection.

3.5 TECHNIQUES OF DATA ANALYSIS

Quantitative and qualitative techniques of data analysis were employed for this study.

3.5.1 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

The large volume of data generated through questionnaire was presented, edited and analyzed using computer software called the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). This analysis was done at two levels of univariate and bivariate. At the univariate level, the researcher used descriptive statistics (such as frequency and percentages), to examine the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and other views of the respondents on the variables in the questionnaire. It also helped the researcher to "turn data into meaningful information" (Osuala, 2005:12).

Meanwhile, percentage was used to determine the magnitude of the responses to the questionnaire.

3.5.2 LIMITATION

Majority of the respondents administered the questionnaires were not accessed at the same time, (left for their various places of primary assignments) however; this was overcome as the researcher visited them after the day.

3.5.3 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

The qualitative data generated through the IDIs was critically analyzed through what could be referred to as "thick description" approach, first and foremost, the transcription of the interview from the recorded tape into paper or written form,

was done at most 24 hours after the interview had taken place. After the transcription of the tapes, the researcher thoroughly read both the transcribed documents and the field notes or hand written records with the sole aim of getting the patterns and direction of the participants or informants' responses. It is also important to identify all responses that have bearing with the research issue, and as such, the nuances (non-verbal expression) of the key informants were not left out in the analysis. The various observations recorded were analyzed as observed in line with the cannon of social research.

In addition, efforts were made to compare the alternative interferences from the researched ideas and the underlying issues. This helps the researcher to know the areas of agreement and disagreement. The researcher took verbatim statement at least three to four in the report or presentation. Finally, the overall analytical conclusions based on meticulous examination of these issues by the researcher were captured in the file pertaining to the underlying issue.

After these separate analyses had been done, the researcher then synergize the findings in order to identify area of convergence and divergence between the data generated from the quantitative and qualitative. This would help in complementing each other and by so doing enrich the content and character of the research

<center>**CHAPTER FOUR**</center>

4.0   **DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is focused on analysis and interpretation of the data.

It is divided into three main parts. First is the respondents socio-demographic attributes, the second contains the interpretation of major finding and third section is based on summary and conclusion on the chapter. It is worthy to note that tables will be use for clarity.

The respondents of this research were Personnel's of the FRSC of the Utako and Kubwa Districts respectively. The total number of respondents administered questionnaires is one hundred and eighty (180)

Socio-demographic attributes of the respondents. The demographic attributes of the respondents in this study include, sex, age, marital status, educational background and job status.

The data shows, that out of the one hundred and eighty (180) respondents administered questionnaire, 140 (75%) which are the majority are male while 40 (22%) of them are female. It could be deduced that male gender dominates the federal road safety corps in Abuja division.

Similarly, the data also show that majority of the respondents 55 (31%) are in the age bracket of 20-29, it also revealed that 10(6) of the respondents are above the age of 60years. Hence it can be concluded that majority of the respondents are still in their active age of service. The data also show that 95 (35%) of the respondents admitted to be single, as against the 75 (45%) who admitted to be married, however, 10 (10%) of the respondents admitted to be divorced. It could be inferred that majority of the respondent are single.

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In another development, the data reveal that 180 (100%) of the respondents all admitted to be indigenes of Nigeria. None admitted being a non indigene. It could be inferred that the personnel's of the FRSC in Abuja Districts are made up of Nigerians.

The highest level of educational attainment of the respondents is tertiary education. This was revealed when 145(81%) of the respondents admitted to have tertiary education, while 35 (19%) of the respondents admitted to have attained secondary education. This shows that majority of the personnel's of the FRSC are highly literate and will have the fore knowledge and understanding of the questions administered on them.

It was also revealed from the data that 105 (58%) of the respondents fall within the junior category while 75 (42%) of the respondents, admitted to be senior staff. It could be deduced that majority of the respondents are junior staffs.

On the number of years spent in Abuja, 165 (92%) of the respondents admitted to have stayed in the FTC for more than five years while 15 (8%) admitted to have stayed less than five years in the FCT. It can therefore be deduced that, majority of the respondents will be versed in terrorist related issues in the FCT.

Table 4.2.1 Respondent's views on the response of FRSC to terrorism

FRSC, response in terms of increased manpower	frequency	Percentage
Strongly agreed	40	22
Agree	40	22
Neutral	10	6
Disagree	65	36
Strongly disagree	25	14
Total	180	100

Table 4.2.2 above shows that 65 (36%) and another 25(14)of the respondents disagree on the response of the FRSC to terrorism in terms of increased manpower respectively, while 40(22) and another 40(22) of the respondents strongly agree and agreed respectively that the FRSC has done enough in terms of increased manpower. It could be deduced that, the FRSC has not responded adequately to terrorism in terms of manpower. Similarly in an interview with one of the regular corps marshal, he has this to say.

In terms of personnel's and number, we cannot meet up with the Nigerian police, still, they cannot tackle terrorism our present staff strength in Nigeria as at the last recruitment exercise stood at 20,000,what can these do to contain terrorism".

Table 4.2.2. Respondents views on the response of FRSC in terms of increased expenditure and funding

FRSC, response in terms of increased expenditure and funding	frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	20	11
Agree	25	14
Neutral	10	6
Disagree	95	53
Strongly disagree	30	17
Total	180 I 100	

Table 4.2.2, on the response of the FRSC to terrorism in terms of expenditure and funding, gathered that 95 (53%) of the respondent's which are the majority disagreed that the FRSC has responded to terrorism in terms of funding and expenditure, 30

(17%) of the responded also strongly affirm the above, while 25 (13%) of the respondents agreed that the corps has done much in terms of expenditure and funding, also 20 (11%) of the respondents also agreed that the FRSC has been adequately funded and performed in terms of expenditure. In conclusion it could be deduced that the FRSC have not been funded adequately and has not performed optimally in terms of expenditure.

The interview granted by another corps marshal affirms the above argument (that the FRSC is underfunded). The key informant has this to say *"the FRSC is not the arm of the police, we are partners in progress but we secure lives in a different dimension, much of the security vote's go to the police, prisons, army and civil defense, we take the "scrap. It is rumored in all angle that security has the highest budget, remember" of it all we lack personnel's funding and equipments. You can't believe it, in utako division here we have only two functional and operational vehicles, and we don't have any towing van"*.

To corroborate the above statement, during the cause of our observation, it was gathered that utako division of the FRSC has two operational vehicles and there was no towing van

Table 4.2.3. Respondents on the FRSC response in terms of increased equipment and facilities

FRSC response in terms of increased equipment and facilities	Frequency	percentage
Strongly agree	25	14
Agree	10	6
Neutral	10	6
Disagree	70	39
Strongly Disagree	65	36
Total	180	100

Table 4.2.3, On FRSC response to terrorism in terms of equipment, and facilities, shows that, 70 (39%) of the respondents which are the majority admitted that the FRSC is not adequately equipped with facilities, also 65 (36%) of the respondent strongly disagreed although, 25 (13%) and 10 (6%) of the respondent agreed and strongly agreed that the FRSC has done well in term of equipments and facilities. It could be concluded however that the FRSC lack the necessary facilities and equipment to contain terrorism optimally.

At the cause of our observation, the Kubwa division has a functional toll van, few offices for the staffs and two functional vehicles. The female Corps marshal interviewed has this to say, *we don't have enough vehicle, even the one we use for operation are not frequently put into use because we have to account for every fuel consumed. We need up to ten functional vehicles, including towing van and a mobile court, hospital and a security division to perform optimally".*

Table 4.2.4 Distribution of respondents according to the operational strategies of the FRSC

Respondents views on surveillance as vital to curbing terrorism	frequency	Percentage
Yes	178	99
No	-	-
No Response	2	1
Total	180	100

4.2.4 Above shows that 178 (99%) of the respondents agreed that surveillance is a fundamental tool in containing terrorism, 2 (1%) of the respondents however rejected the connotation, that surveillance could contain terrorism. It could be argued that surveillance is vital in curbing terrorism.

In an indebt interview, our respondent has this to say "*surveillance is vital in everything even the holy book say "watch" without surveillance "terrorist" comes. At the cause of our observation, it was revealed that men of the corps on guard were strategically placed probably to watch*.

Table 4.2.5.Respondents views on the role interpersonal communication can play in containing terrorism.

Interpersonal communication between the public and FRSC can curb terrorism	frequency	percentage
Yes	178	99
No	-	-
No Response	2	1
Total	180	100

 On interpersonal communication between the FRSC and members of the public as a tool to curb terrorism, 178 (99%) of the respondents which are the majority affirmed that communication between the public and the FRSC is vital in curbing terrorism, however only 2 (1%) of the respondents rejected the importance of communication between the public and the FRSC as a tool to curb terrorism.

Judging from the above data it could be deduced that inter personal communication between the public and FRSC is vital in containing terrorism.

Corroborating the above, our key informant has this to say *"interpersonal communication is key to every problem, at home, school, work and worship centers, and so the FRSC is not an exceptional, without the public, we don't know how terrorist operates unless they strike us "we need the public to survive"*

Table 4.2.6. Distribution of respondents according to their views on construction of bumps on high ways as a tool in containing terrorism

Yes	163	91
Construction of bumps and high walls can curb terrorism	frequency	Percentage
No	17	9
No response	-	-
Total	180	100

On bumps and high walls table 4.2.5 above shows that 163 (91%) of the respondents admitted that construction of bumps could prevent terrorism while 17 (9%) of the respondents rejected the claim. It could be deduced that construction of bumps and high walls could contain terrorism. Affirming the above, the key information has this to say *"we cannot over look the importance of bumps and high walls in every security situations, it acts as a barrier to traffic, it reduces vehicular movements while the walls acts as a check and a medium of control. If you see any one climbing the wall you will easily know he is into business"* at the cause of our observation it was revealed that, there was a six feet high wall on both the utako and Kubwa divisions of the FRSC.

Table 4.2.7 Distribution of respondents on the effect of the security architecture on access to the FRSC offices by the public

Blockage of road leading to FRSC offices	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	178	99
No	2	1
No response	-	
Total	180	100

Table 4.2.4 above shows that 178 (99%) of the respondents who are the majority agreed that the blockage of the road leading to the FRSC offices as a security architectural designed to contain terrorism equally has a negative effect as regards the access of the public to the FRSC offices, 2 (1%) of the respondents rejected the claims that blockage prevents the public's from accessing FRSC offices. From the data it could be gathered that the blockage of the road leading to the FRSC office prevents the general public from accessing the FRSC offices.

At the point of our observation, it was gathered that the movement of people to and from the FRSC offices in utako and kubwa division were in low queue. The data got from the interview affirms to the above results our informant has this to say *"blockage means prohibition, prevention, etc. How can you block a road and expect people to pass? But we weighted the cost and gains and chose to block because if we allow everybody to come in freely Boko Haram too can, freely"*.

Table 4.2.8. Respondents views on the effect of high number of security installations and personnel in preventing the public from accessing FRSC offices

High number of security installations and personnel's prevents the public from accessing the FRSC offices	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	2	1
No	178	99
No Response	-	-
Total	180	100

Similarly the table 4.2.8 above also shows that 178 (99%) of the respondents admitted that high number or the presence of FRSC personnel's and installations could not affect the public from accessing the FRSC offices, while 2 (1%) noted that the presence of FRSC personnel's and installations could affect the public from accessing the FRSC offices. It is worthy of note that the result shows that the presence of security installations and personnel's of the FRSC cannot affect the public from assessing the FRSC offices. Corroborating the above, the key informant has this to say:

"Most security installations are not visible and are not labeled as such, our personnel's are not armed like the police, there are harmless, so their number can never be a barrier to the public from reaching us one on one".

Table 4.2.9 Distribution of respondents on ways through which the FRSC security architecture could be improved.

Arms and ammunition	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	170	94
No	-	-
No response	10	6
Total	180	100

Table 4.2.9 above shows that 170 (94%) of the respondents admitted that if the FRSC is equipped and empowered to use arms and ammunition it will go a long way to contain terrorism.

This is in agreement with the words of the key informant. She has this to say "*terrorist are armed, how can the FRSC fight terrorism without been armed, provisions are not made for us, we needed to be provided with arms and ammunition so that we can fight this war together with other law enforcement agencies like the police*".

Table 4.3.1. Respondents views on other measures to be taken by the FRSC to contain terrorism

Other measures to contain terrorism	frequency	percentage
Body scanners	15	8
Insurance policies for officers	30	17
Installation of scanners at all locations	20	11
Improved conditions of services	22	12
More funding	33	18
Recruitment of qualified officers	30	17
Improved equipment	30	17
Total	180	100

On respondents opinions on other ways they think terrorism could be contained apart from the options provided earlier, 33 (18%) of the respondents argued that there is a need for more funding of the corps, 30 (17%) of the respondents, admitted that room should be made for life insurance for members of the corps, another 30 (17%) of the respondents, advocated for improved equipment, another 30 (17%) of the respondents admitted that the recruitment of qualified officers could be of help, another 22 (12%) of the respondents noted that improved condition of services for officers could curb terrorism, others 20 (11%) 15, (8%) of the respondents respectively, admitted that installation of closed circuit cameral and purchase of more body scanners, will curb terrorism.

Corroborating the above, the key informant has this to say *"we call for more funding, we also needed to be equipped with arms, modern body scanners should be provided and our salaries should be increased so that we can perform optimally".*

<center>**CHAPTER FIVE**</center>

5.0   SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1   INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarizes the findings of this study or research, provides a conclusion and gives adequate recommendations that would aid in the reduction of the existing problem. The chapter is divided into three sub-section summary, conclusion and recommendation.

5.2   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The study shows that the FRSC has not responded to terrorism optimally in terms of man power and personnel. Manpower, in terms of adequate number and training is vital in the fight against terrorism and other social vices, however, the Corps has not done enough in that regards as clearly revealed by the research findings.

Similarly it was gathered that the FRSC has not also responded to terrorism optimally in terms of increased expenditure and funding. Adequate funding of any organisation is a fundamental tool that boost the operational capacity of such agency, however the FRSC was said to be under-funded as clearly revealed in the research findings.

In another related development, the investigation shows that the FRSC lacks the necessary facilities and equipment to be able to contain terrorism adequately. Here the findings gathered that the Corps is not equipped with any arms and ammunition, and was provided few operational vehicles, majority old. Similarly, it was gathered that surveillance can go a long way to check terrorism. Surveillance is a fundamental tool in containing terrorism, as one thing is to be equipped with arms; another thing is to detect crime. Crimes like terrorism cannot be detected without surveillance, hence the call by the research for an intensified effort for surveillance.

It was also gathered from the research that interpersonal communication between members of the public and the Corps is vital in containing terrorism. Interpersonal communication is the only tool that can enable the community give vital and useful information to the Corps on security related issues and their perspective on containing it. It provides an ample opportunity for the Corps to interact freely with the public; the Corps can do this through the organizing of regular seminars and workshops on matters relating to terrorism as it affects the Corps.

The research finding shows that construction of high walls and bumps along roads leading to FRSC offices is vital in the fight against terrorism. The construction of high walls not only prevents the FRSC offices, but secures the lives of the officers, as the walls controls and redirects the movement of people going in and out of the premises. It was gathered from one of the statements of the key informants that whoever is seen climbing the high wall could be said to mean" business"

It was gathered that the blockage of the major roads leading to the FRSC offices as security architecture, put in place by the corps affects the public in their bid to access the FRSC offices.

However, the installation of security equipment and the presence of the personnel of the FRSC by no means affect the members of the public from accessing the FRSC offices. The installations of security cameras are mostly done in hidden locations, it cannot be easily detected and because the men of the FRSC are not armed like their other counterparts, their relationship with the public is not severed.

It was also gathered by the research that the corps should be provided with arms and ammunitions. To effectively contain terrorism the FRSC must be provided and trained in the use of arms and ammunition. Terrorists all over the world are armed and there is no way the Corps can contain terrorism without adequate training and use of arms.

Finally on suggestions on what the respondents think can be done to improve on the security architecture of the FRSC, it was revealed that, life insurance, the installation of more cameral at all locations, provision of more body scanners, more funding, recruitment of more qualified personnel's and provision of improved equipment is vital in containing terrorism.

5.3 CONCLUSION

From the above finding it can be concluded that the FRSC has not done enough in its bid to fight terrorism. Hence more effort needed to be put in place to be able to contain terrorism.

The research gathered that that the FRSC has not performed optimally in terms of increased manpower and personnel. The research also gathered that the Corps has been grossly underfunded all the years and the budgetary allocation must be improved upon.

Similarly, it was gathered by the research that, the FRSC has not performed optimally in terms of equipment and facilities, hence must be improved on.

The research findings also shows that, surveillance, interpersonal communication between the public and the Corps, construction of bumps and high walls as the Corps operational strategies is crucial in the fight against terrorism. This Corp has failed to put in place optimally.

It was gathered by the research that, some of the security architectural apparatuses put in place like the construction of high walls affect the public from accessing the FRSC offices.

On suggestions in improving the security architecture of the FRSC it was gathered that, the equipping of the Corps with arms and ammunitions are vital to containing terrorism. Other suggestions shows that, life insurance policies for officers, provision

of body scanners, improved condition of service of the officers, more funding, recruitment of qualified officers, and improved equipment can contain terrorism.

Hence there is a need for collaborative effort between the corps, government and the general public; hence all hands must be on desk.

5.4   RECOMMENDATION

Human beings at one time or the other need some help to resolve certain issues, failure to achieve these, means that the problem will continue.

The problem of terrorism and the response of FRSC in containing it concern all and indeed needs collective effort.   Against this background, the following recommendations are made.

    i.   The FRSC needs to improve and upgrade its equipment. More operational vehicles should be procured.

    ii.   Adequate funding is critical to the FRSC to be able to implement its strategies through its various programmes and initiatives, hence the budgetary allocation of the FRSC be enhanced by the government.

    iii.   The FRSC should be provided with arms and ammunition and its personnel's be given adequate training in its use.

    iv.   Public enlighten should be given to the public in terms of security architectural mechanism of the FRSC so as not to prevent the public from reaching them.

    v.   The FRSC also needed to create an enabling environment for inter personal communication between other security agencies, and the general public.

    vi.   Modern security gadgets be procured and installed in most FRSC offices

Finally preventive security measures be boosted around all FRSC offices nation-wide

and information gathering be enhanced

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APPENDIX I

QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear respondent,

I am a post graduate student in the Department of Sociology, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria conducting a research on the topic: "an assessment of the security architecture of the FRSC in response to terrorism in the FCT command (Abuja)". This is in fulfillment of a partial requirement for the award of MLCJ. In view of this, I am soliciting for your kind cooperation in answering the questions truthfully. Please note that any information given will be treated with utmost confidentiality, anonymity and used strictly for academic enterprise.

Thanks for your anticipated cooperation.

INSTRUCTION: PLEASE TICK (√) OR FILL IN THE GAP WHERE APPROPRIATE

SECTION A: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ATTRIBUTES OF THE RESPONDENTS

1. Sex: (a) Male [   ]   (b) female [   ]

2. Age: (a) < 20 [] (b) 20- 29 [   ] (c) 30-39 [   ] (d) 40-49 [   ] 50 -59 [   ] (f) 60 > [   ]

3. Nationality: (a) Nigerian [   ] Non-Nigeria [   ]

4. Marital status: (a) single [   ] (b) married [ ] (c) Divorced [ ] (d) Window[]

5. Occupation: _____

6. Sector of occupation (a) public [   ] (b) private [ ]

7. Number of years lived in Abuja _____

8. Which is your job category? (a) junior ( ) (b) senior

9. Educational qualification (a) leaving school certificate [   ] (b) SSCE [   ]

   (c) NCE/ND [ ] (d) PGD/MSC/PhD [   ] (e) none [   ]

SECTION B

RESPONSE OF FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY CORPS TO TERRORISM

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
9	FRSC, responds to terrorism in terms of increased man power					
10	FRSC, responds to terrorism in terms of increased expenditure and funding					
11	FRSC, responds to terrorism in terms of increased provision of equipment and facilities					

SECTION C

OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES OF THE FRSC

12. Do you think the FRSC has enough surveillance to counter terrorism?

     (a) Yes [   ] (b) No [ ]   (C) No response [ ]

13.   Do you think inter personal communications between the public and the FRSC can curtail terrorism? (a) Yes [   ] (b) No [   ]

14. Do you think the construction of bumps and high walls by the FRSC can combat terrorism? (a) Yes [ ] (b) No [   ] (c) No response [ ]

Section D: Effect of the security architecture on access to the FRSC offices by members of the public.

16. Do you think the blockage of the road leading to the FRSC office in any way reduce the corps relationship with the public? (a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]   (c) No response [ ]

17.   Do you think the high number of security installations and personnel's in FRSC offices prevents the General public from accessing the FRSC (a) Yes [   ]

(b) No [   ] (c) no response [ ]

SECTION E: WAYS THROUGH WHICH THE FRSC SECURITY ARCHITECTURECOULD BE IMPROVED.

18. Do you think the use of arms and ammunition by FRSC can help combat terrorism? (a) Yes [ ] (b) No [   ] (c) No response [ ]

19. Do you think other things can be done by the FRSC to combat terrorism? (a) Yes [

    ] (b) No [   ] (c) no response [ ]

20. If yes to the above please state clearly other things that can be done to improve on the security architecture of the FRSC:

_____

_____

_____

_____

APPENDIX 11

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW (IDI) GUIDE

SECTION (A) SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. Age

2. Sex

3. State of origin

4. Marital status

5. Educational status

6. Number of years stayed in the FCT

7. Economic status

8. Occupation

SECTION B:

RESPONSE OF FRSC TO TERRORISM

9. What are your views on the security architecture of the FRSC

Probe for

Efficiency

Reliability

SECTION C: RESPONSE OF FRSC TO TERRORIRSM

10. What are your views on the response of the FRSC to terrorism?

Probe for

- Funding/ Expenditure

- Man power

- Equipment and facilities

SECTION D: OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES OF THE FRSC

How relevant in your views are the operational strategies of the FRSC?

Probe for,

- Surveillance

- Interpersonal communication between FRSC/ public and other law enforcement units

- Construction of bumps, blockage and presence of FRSC security agents.

SECTION E: EFFECT OF THE OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES

The operational strategies designed to curb terrorism have some consequences as members of the public can sometimes be prevented from accessing the FRSC; what do you think are some of these consequences?

Probe for

Fear of the corps by the public

Loss of valuable information by the corps

SECTION F: WAYS TO BOOST THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF THE FRSC: it is believed that the prevention of criminal opportunities can reduce crime. What do you think about this in relation to the FRSC security architecture?

- Probe for more surveillances

- Provision of arms and ammunition for the FRSC

- Increased interaction between the public, corps and other law enforcement agencies

Thanks for your cooperation

APPENDIX 111

OBSERVATION GUIDE (the check list is equally vital here)

1 .Defining the objectives of the observation

2. Identifying and selection of target objects

3. Selections of observation modes and training of observers

4 .Administrative arrangements

5. Observation process

6. Quantification of observation

ITEMS

Number of bumps …………………….

- Number of functional V.sats…………..

- Number of men of the corps on guard………..

- Number of body scanners available to the men of the FRSC on guard…………….

- The height of the wall of the FRSC…………

- The level of the effectiveness of the various blockades

- Frequency of the members of the public coming in and out of the FRSC premises